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It" [Mr. Pitt's crouching to Catharine in the affair of Ochakoff] "passed off, very quietly, in this country; but, the effect of it abroad was long felt; and, I verily believe, that it has had an influence upon all the events, which have, of late years, taken place in the North of Europe. If, then, Mr. Pitt's friends will still upbraid the present administration for want of firmness, of wisdom, of talent, for having made an inglorious peace, I fear not to challenge a comparison; and to defy them to shew me any thing, in the peace of Amiens, half so inglorious, so disgraceful as this. Let any impartial person pronounce by which of the two transactions the national honour has been most tarnished. It will be found, at least, that, if all which the friends of Mr. Pitt say be true, that this administration" [the Whig] "is not the only one that has yielded up the true interest, the glory, of this country to popular clamour, and to the desire of keeping their places."—PLAIN REPLY (a pamphlet imputed to Mr. Agge,) p. 93.

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FALL OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY.

SIR,—There is no interesting period of civil society, that at first sight seems to present so many sources of general and authentic information respecting it, as the progress of the French revolution from July, 1789, to the fall of the revolutionary government. The multitude of public assemblies, in which every part of public affairs and every public measure was canvassed, the number of state trials in which not only the subalterns, but the leaders of all the parties were led to the scaffold, the variety of writers who had themselves been actors in many of the convulsions, are unexampled in the same space of time. But on a closer examination their value is found to be small. Great part of the debates of the states general, the legislative assembly, and the convention are preserved, but they are not only subject to the reserve common to all public discussions, but it was in them that the real power resided, in them that public measures actually originated; it was in assemblies of various descriptions, of many of which none of the proceedings, and of the others very little remains. Among the state trials, in which it might be expected that the conduct of the actors and the transactions in which they were engaged must be explained, there are few in which the accused were either tried or condemned for the real causes for which they suffered. Of the writers, the memoirs of the monarchical annalists of the court, are more to the purpose than the anecdotes of the former levées or coteries of Versailles; in the productions of the Rolands, Brissots, the Louvets, &c. instead of the general movements of the revolution, nothing is to be found but the details of their persecutions, with assertions that they and their friends were the only pure patriots, and that all their opponents were traitors and villains. Of the Dantons, the Robespierres, the Billauds, the Collots, no memoirs are known; if to this be added, that the re-

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volution intercepted the means of private intelligence, there is reason to fear, that unless some yet unknown Davila or de Retz, who may have escaped the sanguinary rage of all the factions, should appear, the real history of that tempestuous period will be lost, not only to the present age, but to posterity; by history, I do not mean a chronological table of incidents, but a living picture, in which may be seen the share that chance, general principles, and the actors had in the events as they passed. I am far from pretending to be able to draw aside the veil with which it is covered; but when ferocious animals have been discovered, who have torn one another to pieces, although it may not be possible to satisfy the man of science by presenting them alive, it may, perhaps, be sufficient for most useful purposes, by collecting the inanimate fragments to endeavour to ascertain their nature, and form some estimate of the mischief that they might occasion.—The transactions at Paris, and the submission of the King operated like an electric shock through the nation: the populace broke loose in almost every part of the kingdom; in the towns they attacked whoever was obnoxious to them, in the country they destroyed the houses and property of the noblesse; and, it was observed, that those who had shewn their dependents the greatest tenderness, had no better fate than those who had treated them with harshness and severity. In some places they marched in such bodies that a kind of civil war commenced; in the Lyonnais several hundreds fell in some encounters; and skirmishes frequently happened, in which many lives were lost. From the first they shewed a disposition to bloodshed: at Paris they led the governor and keeper of the Bastille to execution, and murdered Mons. Flesselles upon suspicion, with marks of savage barbarity; a few days after M. Foulon and M. Berthier, on merely a rumour underwent the same fate. The instances of their excesses

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in the provinces were without number, they insulted the laws and the principles of humanity, a parricide was liberated at the place of execution, and an officer was torn to pieces for demanding from his soldiers some civic or revolutionary medals that had been distributed among them.—The citizens of Paris sent an invitation, which amounted to a command to the King to visit them; he was met by the Mayor M. Bailley, with the keys of the city, who presented them with the well known address, which afforded a good specimen of the meekness and urbanity of philosophers in the exercise of newly acquired power: he was then led in triumph to the town house, where after being exhibited to the victorious citizens, he was carried back to Versailles.—From the time of the King's visit to Paris his name had rarely been mentioned, and how long he might have remained in oblivion is impossible to divine, if he had not sent a message to the national assembly that he had chosen a ministry which he hoped would be agreeable to their wishes. Had they from the first instant after the 15th of July, exerted themselves to restore an efficient government, and to render it free by guarding against abuses, it is doubtful if it was not then already beyond their reach; instead, however, of attempting it, they had been bewildering themselves in inexplicable definitions of the rights of man. It has been insinuated, that the warmth with which the King's message had been received, had not been diminished between the morning and evening session of the 4th of August; in the latter, a member of the noblesse made a motion for renouncing some, and the redemption of other feudal rights; the principle was no sooner broached, than there was a general struggle who should be foremost with motions for levelling all distinctions of order or rank; they were adopted by acclamation without debate or discussion: that session laid the foundation of the destruction of all the privileges of the noblesse, the abolition of tithes, and the confiscation of the property of the clergy. When they had had time for reflection, many members of those orders shewed an inclination to recal their hasty prodigality, but they then found that reflection had come too late. Without an aristocracy there can neither be freedom nor stability of government; it is a powerful and hereditary aristocracy which distinguishes the western nations from those of the east, it is to that that the former are indebted for the mildness and stability of their monarchies, while the latter are buried in despotism and torn by eternal revolutions:

an aristocracy is no less necessary to a free government or even to a republic, than to a simple monarchy; it was on the ruins of the aristocracy that the despotism of Rome was erected. The abuses of an aristocracy have been felt all over Europe, they have been great, but they have never equalled those of despotism, or of what is the prelude to it, the domination of popular factions: they were considerable in France, but in abolishing instead of correcting it, they destroyed the foundations of order and freedom.—In subverting the basis of government, the national assembly were so warmly applauded by the populace, that they fancied or acted as if they fancied that they actually possessed the power of the state. They did not think it necessary to consult the King in respect to their proceedings; they carried their decrees to him and required his assent, when and in whatever manner they pleased. But though they intended that their powers as regenerators of the nation should be unlimited, they resolved, and had the folly to suppose, that they could fetter their successors as they chose. Among the preliminary articles of the projected constitution, it was a subject of keen debate, whether the King's assent should be necessary to the enactment of laws. Their being able to deliberate upon and determine that question, shewed that it was of little consequence; they, however, decided in the affirmative. The account of this resolution no sooner reached Paris, than it produced a considerable fermentation, and the groups of the Palais Royal proceeded to such lengths as to send threatening letters to the national assembly. Of no transaction that forms an era in the French revolution, has less been discovered of the real causes, than of the violence offered to the King and the Royal Family on the 6th of October 1789. It was the subject of a long inquiry before the Chatelet, and of another by a committee of the city of Paris, some members of which, probably knew, but did not chuse to divulge them; it was afterwards discussed in the national assembly, yet nothing was publicly established respecting the real origin of it, for the plot of the Duke of Orleans was evidently the fabrication of the day; it is therefore, necessary to resort to circumstances to endeavour to ascertain it. When these threatening letters were brought to the assembly, the monarchical party who were then a majority, seem to have perceived that their power rested on a very uncertain foundation, and to be sensible that they stood nearly in the same situation that the King did on the 14th of July. They moved that the city of Paris should either



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become responsible for the safety of the members, or that the assembly should remove to some of the provinces. Though this motion was set aside by the order of the day, it is probable that they had come to a determination of attempting to form an efficient government upon their own principles, which had some affinity to those of the British constitution, and that the King and the then ministry had joined in the scheme. The change in the tone of the assembly, their resolution to repress the disorders, the application of the municipality of Versailles, where no extraordinary disturbance had happened, for troops, their being immediately ordered, their reception by the court on their arrival, some mysterious expressions that passed in the King's presence between the president of the national assembly and the keeper of the seals, the latter becoming immediately after so obnoxious to the popular party, the little deference that the city of Paris shewed to the national assembly after they had got possession of the King's person, and the dread that the members of that party shewed of the city, all strongly indicated that something of that nature had been in contemplation. It is likewise highly probable, that it had either transpired or was suspected in Paris, for the insurrection was not accidental, or the caprice of the moment as was industriously propagated, but proceeded upon an arrêt of the district of the Cordeliers, signed by Danton and published on the 4th. After the King was carried to Paris, the assembly desired that measures might be taken to secure the safety of the members, to which the municipality returned for answer, that they were not desirous that the assembly should remove, the assembly themselves were averse to it, and it was only in compliance with the King's request, that they at last resolved to follow him to Paris; a few days after that resolution, several members were threatened on the road between Paris and Versailles, upon which some of the principal members of the monarchical party retired from the assembly. — The city of Paris was not insensible of the essential part they had acted in the revolution. It had been divided by M. Necker into sections at the time of the elections; the sections did not themselves elect the members for the national assembly, but chose electors who again joined in certain numbers for that purpose. The sections during the insurrection of the 14th of July, likewise chose deputies under the name at first of a committee, but afterwards of the provisional municipality or common council. Under all these forms Paris appeared not

only in particular transactions, but took under consideration the laws and constitution, even often assumed a legislative authority, and what was still more formidable, led and conducted the insurrections of the people. M. Necker had been recalled immediately after the revolution; one of the first acts of his administration was to solicit a general amnesty, but he applied for it neither to the King, whose minister he had returned to be, nor to the national assembly which he had called together to regenerate the nation, but to the city of Paris; it was immediately granted, but as immediately recalled when opposed by some of the sections. Early in the revolution the national assembly was divided into two parties, one which preceded the revolutionary spirit and pushed it on, the other which endeavoured to retard it: the same was soon seen in all the public bodies; or, to adopt the language of the revolution, the constituted authorities. Hence the common council, the electors and the sections of Paris, were frequently at variance upon many points; the sections often differed among themselves; except in some great insurrections they were rarely unanimous or nearly so, and upon several occasions they were on the point of entering into a civil war within the city itself. While the national assembly had been employed in framing a constitution for the nation, the provisional common council of Paris had been composing one for itself; it included almost all the powers of government, and made it nearly a state within itself: the national assembly would not sanction it. But, however much these two bodies might have differed, the actors of the 14th of July and the 6th of October, shewed so little respect to the authority of either, that the national assembly had been only a few days in Paris, when the common council solicited them to repress the excesses of the people. When the national assembly found themselves supported by the common council, they passed a law resembling our riot act, which they stiled martial law; in consequence of which a trifling mob was dispersed without opposition; the murderer of a baker, who had been hanged, probably from private pique, but for the ostensible reason of having a few loaves in his possession; the butchers of the mayor of Trepes who had been dashed to pieces, because he did not resign his office at the request of some blackguards, and the assailants of a commissary who narrowly escaped the same fate, were punished, produced a momentary calm, and the law was then nearly forgotten. When the national assembly arrived at that part of the constitution which

relates to the organization of the municipalities, many of the sections insisted that the plan of the government of Paris should be left to them; the national assembly on the other hand, to break the power of the city which they dreaded, wanted to change the government of it entirely, and to divide it into separate departments and districts; but that was so strenuously opposed by many of the sections, that they thought it prudent not to persist; the municipality then demanded an extensive jurisdiction beyond the city; a compromise at last ensued, the provisional municipality was dissolved, and a new one chosen; the assembly resolved that the sections should meet only for elections; the leaders of them had been so exorbitant in their demands, that they had outrun the public opinion, finding themselves not supported, they did not oppose it, but they never failed to assemble when it suited their purposes, and their right was seldom afterwards contested.—When Mirabeau moved the remonstrance to the King for removing the troops before the revolution, he had moved as part of it, that the citizens of Versailles should be armed to preserve the peace; that part of the motion was not carried, but it was put in execution in Paris during the insurrection; and, of the citizens who offered themselves, forty eight thousand were selected under the name of Paris Militia, afterwards changed to that of National Guards; they chose Mons. de la Fayette for their commander, who as might be expected was confirmed by the King. The municipality applied to the national assembly for a decree to regulate and embody them; that assembly returned for answer that they had devoted themselves to the labours of the constitution, and they only deprived it of so much of their precious time, as to publish an address to the people requesting them to return to order. The national guards were imitated by the towns over the whole kingdom: those of Paris took upon themselves all the military duty that related to the police or the internal government of the country, but they neither enforced the laws, nor did they submit to subordination themselves: the murders that followed the 14th of July were perpetrated, notwithstanding the prayers and intreaties of M. de la Fayette; they marched with him to Versailles, but they permitted the populace to kill some of the body guards on the 6th of October, and to carry off the King and the Royal Family prisoners to Paris. Those of Versailles took from the regular troops, the duty of guards to the King and the national assembly; even the French guards who had served the revolution faithfully, were so

much disgusted that they marched off and joined their own regiments. After the 6th of October, by the removal of the King and the national assembly to Paris, both the executive and legislative authorities fell into the hands of the citizens. The national guards of the provinces were not long in perceiving the influence that the city of Paris and their brethren there had acquired from possessing them. Soon after the national assembly removed to Paris, the national guards in part of Dauphiny and the Vivarrais, entered into an association, the ostensible object of which was to support the constitution: that association was joined by great part of the southern, and afterwards of the western provinces; they desired to associate with their brethren in the capital, which was granted, and not long after terminated in a general confederation at Paris, on the anniversary of the 14th of July. The association extended so rapidly, and became so active through correspondence, deputations, and congresses, that it was feared that they would become the most powerful body in the kingdom, and it is very difficult even to conjecture what might have been the consequence, if their views had not clashed with those of the city of Paris. The confederates after the 14th of July, instituted a club at Paris, and expressed a desire to compose part of the guard of the King and the national assembly, but this was very coolly received in the metropolis.—The army as well as every other department of the state, had felt the effects of the revolution; discipline had been greatly relaxed, but no general symptoms of disobedience or separation from their officers appeared, till after the general confederation had been in agitation; the soldiers had evidently been tampered with to join in it, the measure was brought forward by one of the sections of Paris, and the King or his ministers did not think it prudent to refuse his consent. At the same time that the minister of the war department, notified to the national assembly the King's permission for the soldiers to send deputies to it, he informed them that a dangerous insubordination had appeared in some regiments, and that they had established permanent committees, who passed judgment upon their officers. It could not be expected that the effects of so dangerous a precedent could be prevented, except by the most vigorous measures at the beginning; but the assembly, instead of proposing such to the King, passed it over by thanking him for the communication, and referring it to their military committee. The pantomime of the confederation had been acted only two or three weeks, before

[53] The same minister requested that they would immediately use means for restoring the discipline of the army; informing them that every messenger brought an account of a new mutiny, that the committees increased every day, both in number and audacity, that their deputations came to him and intimated haughtily the resolutions of their constituents, that the subjects of almost all those contentions were pecuniary claims, and that they erected themselves into judges of their own demands, that the same spirit threatened to infect the whole army, that a correspondence was carried on between them, and that they were on the point of forming military congresses. The assembly then did take it into consideration; they passed a decree, which was so far from being in the spirit of military discipline, that it was rather a censure upon the officers. Under every weak and inactive administration abuses are permitted; they are dangerous to government by affording a just reason of complaint, they are still more dangerous when any disturbance arises, as they either compel the government to infringe the principles of justice, or to yield at the moment that it ought to exact implicit obedience. It is to be doubted if the funds of the French regiments were always strictly administered, but when they were not, I believe, in time of peace at least, that it was generally the treasury, not the soldier that suffered. That decree could have reached Nanci only a few days, when the garrison completely mutinied and seized the military chest. The national assembly, instead of subjecting them to a court martial, declared them guilty of high treason; however, the King was requested, or rather empowered and ordered to suppress the mutiny; the officers whom he sent were arrested, and M. Bouillé was obliged to march against the mutineers with a large party of troops and national guards; an action ensued in which several hundreds were killed. Although no other terminated so fatally, breaches of discipline as great were almost innumerable: the soldiers were received with open arms by the populace, and the blame was thrown upon the officers, who were stigmatized by the revolutionary and barbarous term of aristocrat.—The choice that the King had made of his ministers on M. Necker's return, gave at that time general satisfaction, but the 6th of October had not been long past, when it was seen that their popularity was already in the wane. Like all the prevailing parties that succeeded each other in the French revolution, they no sooner came into office, than they wished to restore order and enforce go-

vernment, while it was in their hands: this by no means suited those who were in pursuit of the same object. An attack was begun upon the ministry, and their administration was treated with little less asperity than had been formerly shewn to that of the old government. For some time these accusations met with little countenance in the national assembly, but in the city of Paris they were more favourably received, and the oppositions continued to increase till the time of the affair of Nanci. That though a single was so strong an effort to restore authority, that it inflamed the popular party; a vast crowd collected and demanded the dismissal of the ministers; their rage was particularly directed against the minister of the war department and M. Necker, whom they threatened to seize. The consequences of falling into their hands were sufficiently known: the latter had been for some time so much disgusted with the little attention that had been paid to his plans for restoring order, either in the finances or the government, that it was supposed he was then on the point of resigning; on the movement of the populace he fled in fear of his life from that city, which he had entered little more than twelve months before for the second time, as the idol of the people, and the saviour of the nation. This minister who had had France at his devotion was arrested on his journey, and wrote to the national assembly, who ordered his release; when at liberty, instead of going to Plombières as he intended, he hastened to Copel, and did not think himself safe till he was beyond the frontiers of France: he furnished one more example, if more had been wanting, of the instability of popular favour. He too placed this change in respect to himself to the account of the popular writers, nor seemed to perceive how much he had himself contributed to prepare the soil for the growth of principles which they had merely assisted to propagate. M. Necker had not been long gone before the question respecting the ministry was brought on in the national assembly; the decree of censure was still lost by a small majority, but the sections of Paris commenced a warfare against them, on which three more of them retired, the Archbishop of Bourdeaux boldly demanded the charges that could be preferred against him, but the King ordered him to deliver up the seals, and appointed an officer of the common council of Paris in his place. M. de Montmorin still remained in office.—The ministry were no sooner removed than the same party directed their efforts against M. de la Fayette. Though he was no longer

the popular favourite of the 15th of July, he still had considerable influence over great part of the national guards. With them he had not been able to prevent the commotions, but he had often moderated them. The citizens to save themselves from duty, had taken into pay six thousand, the greatest part of whom were deserters and vagabonds; instead of dispersing the mobs they had frequently joined them; he had mustered the citizens and prevented many excesses; nothing more was necessary to make him an object of vengeance. The popular leaders at first endeavoured to make him resign; they harrassed him by perpetual rumours of insurrection, and encouraged and supported some of the commanding officers of the districts in refusing to acknowledge his authority; but, when they found that he remained firm at his post, they had recourse to means of another complexion. A mob proceeded to Vincennes with the declared intention of levelling the castle; M. de la Fayette followed them with the national guards, where, while he was arresting some of the most active, a report was brought that the Thuilleries was to be attacked; he immediately marched back, and was very near being assassinated on his return. It is to be doubted if any thing was really intended against the King at that time, but upon the first rumour of it a large party of his friends hastened to his defence; it was soon known that they had arms, upon which the King ordered them to be delivered up, and in them were surrendered the last arms that appeared in his defence. Some weeks after when the King prepared to go to St. Cloud, the populace collected to prevent his departure. M. de la Fayette arrived with the national guards, and was exerting himself to open a passage for the King, when a grenadier of the national guards called out to the populace that they would tear the red flag, the sign of military law, and would not fire upon the people, upon which M. de la Fayette resigned. He had no sooner resigned than a great majority of the national guards joined in requesting him to resume the command; he repeatedly refused, and did not at last consent till they engaged implicitly to obey his commands. The department of Paris with the Duke de la Rochefoucault at their head, took this opportunity to inform the King, that the jealousy of the people arose from his keeping suspected persons, especially recalcitrant clergy about him, upon which he dismissed the dignified clergy that he had till that time retained in his service. — If in tracing the leading principles, and distinguishing characteristics of the present times,

it were not necessary to keep the attention steadily fixed on subjects so superiorly interesting, there occur at almost every step secondary objects, which in any other circumstances would be held to be of the first importance. Among these the fate of the parliaments and the clergy, from their intimate connexion with the revolution, strongly attract observation; the former were the principal actors in bringing on the revolution, they were among the first that it annihilated, and almost all the most active members of them afterwards perished on the scaffold, while Mons. Maupeou and Mons. de la Brienne died quietly in their beds; the latter were the first that broke the union of the orders, and led the way to the success of the revolutionists; they were despoiled of their property, were accused of being the authors of all the distractions of the kingdom, became the objects of execration, involved religion itself in their ruin, and were at last subjected to a persecution that furnished more martyrs than the persecution of all the Roman Emperors. * — When the King was brought back from Varennes, he became without disguise what he had been in reality since the 6th of October, a prisoner of state; he was interrogated like a common criminal, and the royal authority suspended. While he thus remained a prisoner, the national assembly debated whether by the constitution his person should be inviolable; whatever licence they might themselves take in that respect, they resolved that it should be so to their successors. Their voting him a negative to the proceedings of future assemblies, had made him a prisoner, and brought themselves under restraint; their resolution of his inviolability, though of little consequence in itself, had nearly produced another crisis. A petition against that decree was made use of as a pretext for calling together an immense concourse of people in the Champ de Mars.

* Widely as the French clergy may have differed in many respects from the Irish catholic clergy, instructive lessons may be drawn from studying the conduct of the Gallican church, for a considerable time before and during the French revolution. After a full consideration, it may perhaps, be the opinion of most reflecting men, that our administrations have been unpardonable, in not having long since begun a radical change in the catholic clergy of Ireland, and that till that is accomplished, there is little hope that they can be incorporated either with the protestants or the government of this country.

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The national assembly were aware of the danger that awaited them; upon two unfortunate wretches who had concealed themselves to hear what passed being discovered and put to death by the populace, they ordered them to be dispersed by force. The national guards were called out; several of the sections had opposed Mons. de la Fayette's being again invested with the command; but the submission that they had been obliged to make, before he resumed it, added much to his authority, and what operated still more powerfully, they were received by the populace with a shower of stones; a skirmish ensued, in which the mob was dispersed with considerable loss, and martial law was proclaimed. This act of vigour was very ill supported: the assembly ordered a prosecution against the authors of the tumult; the place that the officers of the courts of justice chose for arresting Danton, was the electoral assembly; they were then themselves arrested for presuming to interrupt an elector in the exercise of his duty; a report of this was made to the national assembly, who though they condemned the conduct of the electoral assembly, to get rid of the affair referred it to the courts of justice, whose authority had been insulted, and who were unable to command redress. The whole was probably a juggle between Danton and the officers, and shewed in the strongest light how little authority the national assembly really possessed: it notwithstanding had more effect than all their decrees, for they were allowed to finish the constitution without further opposition. When it was finished, the most difficult part still remained, how it should receive the King's free and unconstrained assent. The device they made use of was equally ingenious and satisfactory, with the rest of their proceedings; they removed the suspension of the royal authority, permitted the King to go to Fontainebleau or Rambouillet, provided he was carried there by the Parisian national guards; at the same time they informed him, that they had divested themselves of their functions as government makers, and that he must either accept or reject it without addition or alteration: he very wisely preferred staying in Paris, to being led a few miles from it by the national guards; and gave his assent, saying, that he thought many parts of it might, and he hoped would be afterwards changed for the better. The national, or, as it was afterwards stiled, the constitutional assembly, in contributing their part to annihilate the former government, that they might have free scope for framing a constitution of their own, acted

like a man who should kill a living animal because it had faults and imperfections, that he might make one to suit his own fancy, and who vamped up a figure which pleased his eye, but which was devoid of life, solidity and motion, and was soon thrown aside as useless lumber.—The constituent assembly from a desire of courting popularity, by shewing a puritanical spirit of self-denial, had declared their own members ineligible to the next or legislative assembly, by which means the nation was again abandoned in a very precarious state, to another set of men totally unacquainted with public affairs. However unequal the former had been to the task they had undertaken, the latter were inferior to them in every respect. The members to whom they at first shewed some deference, were dabblers in literature about Paris, and the first of their proceedings, were to shew so great marks of disrespect to the King, as to give offence to the public, and they were obliged to return upon their own steps. Even the populace of Paris were at no loss to appreciate their character; for a few months after their meeting, the popular part of the sections presented a petition, the principal object of which seems to have been to shew them their motto, the *beaux esprits* and the blockheads all want to be free; and the emphatical manner in which they referred to it, soon proved that they intended it as an analysis of the assembly itself. When such were their opinions, it was not to be expected that they would shew them much respect. Not long after, a great crowd, apparently to show their strength, desired permission from the assembly, to file through the hall with their motley arms, which the assembly did not dare to refuse.—The assembly occupied themselves almost exclusively, with a persecution of the emigrants, and the refractory clergy: the former soon involved them in disputes with foreign powers where the emigrants had taken up their residence, and in some places had collected in considerable numbers. The ministers who had been appointed to succeed the monarchists were popular at the time they entered into office, but from the progress of the revolutionary spirit, they soon found themselves in the same situation with their predecessors. They underwent the same process, they were attacked by the minority of the assembly, buffeted by the populace, at last all impeached, and most of them perished in the subsequent massacres. The new ministry decided for an immediate declaration of war, against the Emperor and empire, to which the King assented, and which was highly applauded by the leaders

of the assembly. The troops were ordered to enter the Austrian Netherlands, but were every where repulsed, and some of them attacked and put to death their own officers. The party generally known by the name of the Gironde or Brissotine party, were the most active in the assembly; they were republicans, and had evidently been driving more at the destruction of the remaining phantom of royalty, than acting from any views of national interest, in the measures that they had urged. They spread a report that the King had still a secret council, who were the authors of all the disasters of the campaign; to render them more odious, they stiled them the Austrian committee; they inflamed the populace, and prepared them for the most desperate purposes. The minister of the war department proposed to the assembly, to collect an army in the neighbourhood of Paris; it was highly agreeable to the citizens, who intended that it should be composed of their own volunteers: it was likewise warmly supported by the Gironde party, with the hopes of being able to form it of the confederated national guards of the different departments, to secure themselves against the city of Paris, or perhaps to subject it: it was adopted by the assembly, and they likewise passed a decree for the transportation of the clergy who would not take the oaths to the present government. Mons. Dumourier who had a share in the administration about this time, has thrown a gleam of light upon this part of the revolution. It is not easy to say whether the captious, sullen, blind obstinacy of the popular party in their course; the utter ineptitude of the automatons who rendered the appellation of minister contemptible, or the infantine ignorance of the unfortunate remnant of a court, in the management of popular assemblies, and a popular government, after three years of severe experience, is the most surprising part of the scene. M. Dumourier, who was not deficient in a just perception of public business, and had all the dexterity of the old court under which he was educated, had probably, become a revolutionist that he might become a minister; when he had arrived at that station, it is to be expected that he would have served the King faithfully; active and sanguine, he seems to have thought that with proper conduct the revolution might have been led; it is to be doubted, but the King could not have been more unfortunate, if he had reposed confidence enough in him to have tried the experiment. The King made use of the negative that was allowed him by the constitution, and refused his assent to both decrees.

When that was known, an immense crowd, part of them armed and preceded by some of the national guards with cannon, marched to the assembly, filed off before them, and proceeded to the Thuilleries. The King's guard appointed by the constitution, had been disbanded without consulting him; the national guards upon duty said they had no orders; when the mob threatened to force their way, to avoid the effusion of blood they were permitted to pass, they burst open the doors and filled the apartments of the King and the Royal Family, who were for some time in the greatest danger; he notwithstanding steadily refused to sanction the two decrees. From that day the city was in perpetual commotion, the alarm bell was frequently sounded, and the populace were often on the point of proceeding to extremities. The galleries of the legislative assembly had for some time indecently expressed their opinions of public men and public measures, they then began to overawe the proceedings of the assembly, and the deposition of the King was often and freely discussed. Detachments of the national guards arrived from several parts of the kingdom, and at last a party of those of Marseilles, who had without any authority, been giving law by force of arms to the southern provinces, entered Paris; they were caressed by the violent part of the citizens, their ferocious appearance and savage manners struck terror into the rest of the inhabitants, and they attacked with the loss of some lives those who had shewn any sympathy for, or afforded any protection to the Royal Family. It is said, that there was a secret meeting of the principal leaders of the Gironde party, with some popular members of the assembly, in which the 10th of August was arranged; whether there was such a meeting or not, there is reason to think from the conduct and expressions of Danton, that the essential part of it had been previously determined in the city. It is probable that the King had some intimation of it a considerable time before it happened; for, it is likewise said, that he had private conversation of importance with the Swiss officers, which in the state that affairs then were, it may be presumed was upon that subject. The situation of the King was deplorable: unless the Parisian national guards joined in his defence, there was little chance that any resistance he could have made would have been effectual; they were wavering, and whether they would have supported him, if he had himself acted a more decided party is a problem that can never be solved; it is at least doubtful, considering the enemy they

had to oppose. He did not put them to the test, but withdrew to the assembly, as he did on the 15th of July; unfortunately, circumstances were much changed, the assembly far from being able to afford him protection as they had then done, when acting in concert with the populace of Paris, were themselves degraded into a tool of the insurgents, and were ordered to sign their own dissolution. All the competitors for power had united to efface the last remains of the old government; however small the real power and influence of the crown might then have been, it was a considerable clog upon all the parties; because, while it was in existence, it was the medium through which the functions of government must generally pass; but the King was no sooner deposed, than two powerful factions which had been distinctly pronounced before, openly entered the lists for superiority. The one was the city of Paris, who had possession of the King and the assembly, with a strong party in the latter, though a minority in their favour; the other was the party of the Gironde, with a majority of the assembly, and who had in their interest the confederated national guards, especially those of the other departments, who were by no means satisfied with the presumptuous pretensions of the city of Paris. The new common council which the sections had chosen for the 10th of August, insisted upon having the entire charge of the Royal Family, and acted more like a legislature, and as having the supreme power of the state, than as a council of police.

(To be continued.)

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CONTINENTAL COALITION.—It is generally useless to speculate upon a subject like this, without having official documents to proceed upon; and, even now, when we have before us the official note of the Russian minister, Baron Novosiltzoff (see p. 188), and the demi-official answer of the French government (see p. 213), I should be inclined to pass over them in silence, did not the exultations, in the ministerial papers, seem to call for the few remarks, with which I purpose to trouble the reader. Ever since it has been understood, that Novosiltzoff, who we now find was destined to enter upon negotiations with the French, in consequence of the overture made to England, by Napoleon, in January last; ever since it has been understood, that this minister was, or was about to be, recalled, previous to his entering on any negotiation at all, the Pitt newspapers have discovered strong symp-

toms of satisfaction. At what, one could hardly guess, especially when it was recollected, that the Russian minister was, as it was then said, and as has now appeared to be the case, sent *at the request of his Britannic Majesty!* Considering this fact, one could hardly guess at the cause of the minister's joy, that the messenger of peace was about to return without having reached his journey's end; but, when we came to see the note of Novosiltzoff, and to find, that, by the effect of recent events, Russia had been induced to assume a language becoming an intended principal in the war; then we could discover a reason for exultation, because such a circumstance was calculated to feed those hopes, which the immediate interest of the minister leads him to endeavour to keep alive. No sooner did the note of Novosiltzoff appear, than the ministerial press began to sing triumph; not triumph over the enemy, at least, the foreign enemy, but the enemy in St. Stephen's chapel. "Here," said the Pitt writers, "you insisted that 'none of the powers of the continent would form alliances with Mr. Pitt; now, ye Foxes and Windhams hide your diminished heads!' Neither upon the moderation nor upon the originality of this sentence will we stop to remark; but, as to the fact, which it expresses, we must be indulged in a few words. We never said, that Mr. Pitt would find none of the powers of the continent to form alliances with him against France; for, which of us did not know, that there never was that subsidy yet offered which did not find some one ready to receive it. But, what we did say, or, at least, what I said, I will now repeat, and shall be very much inclined to leave the reader to judge (without any comment as to what has since taken place), whether I was right, or wrong. I said, that, at the instigation of Mr. Pitt, no coalition, upon such a principle and such a scale as were necessary to restore the liberties of Europe, or even to check the power of France, would ever be formed; I said, that it was very doubtful whether Russia would take an active part in the war, and that, if she did, it would be totally useless, with regard to England, unless Austria or Prussia, or both of them, joined her, and heartily co-operated with her in the war; and, upon its being somewhat ill-naturedly observed, that, if Austria and Prussia joined Russia in the war, we should then say, that it would be quite useless unless Mr. Pitt could gain the Mohawk Indians also; upon this observation being made, I said, that the Mohawks were not necessary, but that money was, and that all I should, in case of a

co-operation of the three great powers abovementioned, require of Mr. Pitt, would be to find *guineas* (for his paper-money would not serve) to support the expenses attendant upon such a coalition for the space of five years, or, if that were too much reasonably to expect, I would content myself with three years. From this re-statement of our opinions, and which re-statement the reader will, I think, pronounce to be correct, he will easily judge of the fitness of the present triumph, on the part of the ministerial writers, who, at the most, pretend to make *sure* of Russia only; and venture to extend even their *hopes* no further than Austria. — In order to judge of their wisdom in placing so implicit a reliance on the active co-operation of Russia, we should peruse the several documents relating to the dispute between Russia and France, the progress of which dispute, with references to the several documents thereunto appertaining, will be found in this work, Vol. VI. p. 600. — The disposition of Russia, as pretty clearly indicated by the footing upon which she chose to remain, with respect to France, was before remarked on; and, surely, such a rupture, on the part of a great and leading power, was never before heard of in the world. That the chief cause of her anger with Napoleon was his apparent, his evident, resolution not to suffer her to interfere in the affairs of the South of Europe, particularly Italy, every one must, one would think, have been then convinced. It is, therefore, quite natural, that she should now be more seriously angry with him than before; but, power to hurt does not always accompany anger; and, in the present case, such a power certainly does not exist, and will not exist, unless the aid of either Austria or Prussia can be obtained by Russia. That the aid of Prussia will be obtained there does not, at present, any hope appear to be entertained; and, if Austria joins Russia in the war, without Prussia, I think, for the reasons which I have before stated, that the overthrow of the House of Austria is at much less distance than many people seem to imagine; for, in the case of such a war, the peace we should reasonably have to look to, would be a peace, in which France and Russia would both be gainers: who the loser must be is evident. — It is, of course, without any pretensions to superior sagacity, that I offer an opinion upon such a subject; but, it is an opinion I have long entertained, and more than once expressed, that, to divide Europe into two great empires, the EASTERN and the WESTERN, would not be very uncourteous to the politics of the two

powers, of whose disputes we have here been speaking; and, I will leave it entirely for the reader to judge, whether something very nearly approaching to such a division would not be a possible, not to say a probable, consequence of such a coalition, and such a war, as those, for which the ministerial writers appear so impatient, and at the prospect, real or imaginary, of which they give such demonstrations of joy. — That such a consequence of the war would, to say nothing more, add to the already great dangers of England, no one will, I should suppose, be inclined to deny; and, therefore, we ought very seriously to reflect upon the probable consequences of a war, in which, at this time, Austria should become a part. If, indeed, Russia had stepped forward for the *sole*, and the *openly-avowed*, purpose of replacing the Bourbons upon the throne of France, there would have been ample security for Austria; but, after all that we have seen, who amongst us, even tis common men, does not know pretty well to what to ascribe the declaration in the Russian note, that the negotiation should commence, if at all, without acknowledging the new title of Buonaparté. No one will be unmindful of the advances towards the overthrow of Austria, that Buonaparté might make, and, perhaps, is making, *in peace*; but, it will take him long to arrive at Vienna in peace; not so, probably, in war; and then, let it be recollected, that there will be nobody for him to *negotiate* with but Russia! For the result of such a negotiation what friend of Austria must not tremble! In short, though there appear great dangers to Austria from remaining at peace with Napoleon, the progress of his power unchecked, there appear, under the present circumstances, greater dangers to her in a war, in which she should be joined, upon the Continent, only by Russia; and, as the preservation of Austria is of great importance to us, her being now plunged into such a war, ought, if my opinions are correct, to be a subject of sorrow rather than of joy. — Let us now see what a figure *we* exhibit in this scene. Our Sovereign receives from Napoleon an overture to treat for the restoration of peace. He is advised to answer, and does answer, that he cannot negotiate without first consulting with those powers of Europe, with whom he has “confidential communications.” He is then advised, as we are now informed by the Russian Envoy, to request the Emperor of Russia to send a person “to meet the pacific overtures,” which Napoleon had made to the Court of London; and, it is singular enough, that in

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casting about us for a mediator, and a bearer of our pacific views, we pitch not only upon a power at enmity with France, but a power who had chosen a *cessation of all diplomatic intercourse* as the means of giving proof of that enmity! Russia, whether in consideration of Lord Mulgrave's being our foreign minister, or for some other reason equally cogent, perhaps, yields to our solicitation, and sends an Envoy, not to Paris, but to Berlin, there to ask the mediation of a third power, in the important matter of obtaining passports for the person sent in our behalf. The Court of Berlin obtains the passports; but, just as the Envoy is setting off, he is stopped, not by the request of England, but by the fresh umbrage which Russia has taken at the conduct of Napoleon, whereat the English ministry express *their joy*! If any thing was ever more puerile than this, better calculated to expose the first mover to the contempt of the world, it has not yet reached my ear, or presented itself to my imagination. But, as we shall see more clearly in the sequel, it ought not to surprise any one, who has had an opportunity of observing the expedients, the miserable shifts, which have constantly marked the Pitt system of external policy, according to which, the interests and honour of the nation, and the dignity of the crown, are as nothing, when weighed against the place of the minister. The minister, one of whose eyes is constantly fixed, as I have frequently observed before, upon the City of London and the other upon the Chapel of St. Stephen, found that it would be expedient for him to do something, in consequence of the French note of January last. To send a negotiator to Paris he could not, without hazarding his influence at court, or without exposing himself to the mortification of being compelled to return to the peace of Amiens and all its impositions, while France conceded nothing to him. In short, he saw, in a negotiation with France, great danger to the duration of his power; and, therefore, he chose the round-about measure that we have just been contemplating, a measure which he regarded as sufficient to furnish him with a justification both with those who wished for a continuation of the war and those who wished for peace. The *absurdity*, therefore, which the demi-official French writer seems to impute to the measure exists only when the measure is considered as to its effect amongst the different nations concerned; and, that writer ought to have known, that this is not the light in which Mr. Pitt ever considers any of the transactions, in which he, or has been, engaged with foreign

nations. The question with him is not, whether a proposition to treat, whether a treaty itself, will produce good or ill to his country; but, whether it will produce effects favourable to the duration of his power; whether it will add to his majorities in the House of Commons; and, M. Hauterive (to whom the French demi-official paper is ascribed) certainly does him great injustice in imputing to him projects for dividing the French territory; for, his projects of dividing, Mr. Hauterive may be well assured, extend not an inch beyond the opposition benches of the House of Commons, which projects will, too, no longer succeed with him. Certainly, "when the English ministry wish for peace, they will feel that a French note must be answered with an English note." Certainly: as to the business of restoring peace, there could not be the least necessity for obtaining a Russian channel of communication, especially after Napoleon had made the overture. It was, besides, degrading in the extreme; and, the question of Hauterive, whether France and England could be "so reduced as to await the decision of their differences from a distant country, to whom the interests of both are so little known," is very pertinent. But, though there were these, and many more objections to the mode of proceeding adopted upon this occasion, all these objections were overbalanced by the mighty consideration above-mentioned: and thus it is, that we suffer, that we are punished, that we are burdened sometimes and disgraced at other times, for the purpose of gratifying the love of rule, the haughtiness (for I will not call it ambition) of a minister.—As to the *retribution* contained in the French answer to the Russian note, it is, indeed, a tough morsel. I should be glad to hear it replied to by the Russian cabinet, on the one hand, and by Mr. Pitt and Lord Wellesley on the other. It is true, that the people whose countries have been over-run, who have been rendered either the subjects of, or tributary to, Russia and England, are, generally, a feeble and contemptible race, and that to defeat them in battle is little more than defeating a flock of sheep or a herd of swine; but, will Lord Wellesley or the hero of York Town say this? No: we have boasted of our eastern victories as glorious to our arms; we have boasted of our eastern conquests; we have boasted of our "Empire in the East." The makers and defenders of the peace of Amiens, when told of the acquisition of territory made by

France, and left in her hands, failed not, in the fullness of that "discretion," for the want of which they were reproached, to remind us, and to remind the world too, of our acquisitions in the East, acquisitions which, they asserted, were sufficient to balance against those of France; and, let it never be forgotten, that that wise man and most discreet gentleman, Mr. Pitt, in his speech of the 3d of November, 1801, scrupled not to say, that our conquests in India had given a perfect consolidation to our strength. Indeed, from the whole course of his reasoning, it appeared, that he considered, or, at least, wished his hearers to consider, our conquests in India as more than equivalent to the conquests which the treaty of Amiens had left in the hands of France; whereat the kind-hearted, the generous souls, that listened to his harangue were ready to blubber with exultation. Now, however, they find the inconvenience resulting from such a boast; they find that they have to suffer from the force of an argument founded upon that boast, or, at least, which that boast renders fair, and, by the English ministry, incontrovertible; they feel the effects of a minister's acting upon a system of expedients, and having in view no other object than the preservation of his power. Such a minister never looks beyond the present moment. He is always in trouble of some sort or other. His place is continually in danger, in a greater or less degree, and he is continually thinking of the means of obviating that danger. When he was defending the preliminaries of peace, and boasting of the effects of our eastern conquests, the danger to his place (for, in fact, he still held it) arose from the statement of his adversaries, that he had left France in possession of an acquisition of territory that would render her the mistress of all the west of Europe, and that would, consequently, greatly hazard the safety of England. Thus pressed, all that he sought, or wished for, was, something wherewith to meet this statement; and out came the boast about our victories and acquisitions in India. We may condemn his conduct, we may curse the hour that committed our interests and our honour to "prudence" such as his; but, no one can blame the French for availing themselves of the argument with which he has furnished them, and which neither he, nor any one of the present ministers, can, without the most palpable inconsistency, without giving proofs of insincerity the most scandalous, attempt to controvert. They have boasted, they have officially come forward with an annual boast of their Indian conquests;

and, who does not know, that a very few months have elapsed, since the two Houses of Parliament, after having solemnly resolved that Indian conquests are unwise and unjust, passed a vote of thanks to a person who had sent home an account of his having made more Indian conquests. In short, is it not notorious to the whole world, that we have, in the East, over-run nation after nation; and that, either as subjects or as tributary states, we have compelled, by one means or another, more than twenty millions of people to submit to our will. As to the description of those *means* I will not attempt it. The reader will himself easily determine, whether they have been more or less unjust, more or less cruel, more or less insulting, more or less violent and fraudulent, than the means employed by the French in their European conquests and annexations; but, I am sure he will agree with Mr. Burke, and will keep the fact in mind, that "fraud, "injustice, oppression, and plunder, in India, are crimes of the same blood, family, "and cast, with those that are born and "bred in Europe."—It may, indeed, be said, and I am ready to say, and think myself able to prove, that our conquests, that our "Empire in the East" and our tributary states there, not only do not tend to strengthen, but that they tend to enfeeble, and have actually enfeebled the power of England, while they afford the means of sapping the foundation of her constitution and of vitiating the manners of her people. This the French know, too: but will our ministers dare assert it? Have they not asserted the contrary? Will they not persevere in those assertions? Does not their system in a great degree require such a perseverance? And who, then, are to blame, who reasonably can blame, the French for profiting therefrom?—As to the argument, that the powers of Europe have no right to interfere in matters relating to India, that country coming under the description of *colonies*; what, in answer to this, has Napoleon to do more than to consider Italy, Switzerland, and Holland as colonies? Such an argument is worth nothing; and, if we resolve, that the law of nations shall not be appealed to as a rule of conduct for us with regard to India and the twenty millions of people there our subjects or tributary to us, what right have we to appeal to the law of nations as a rule for the conduct of France with regard to her neighbours? Our plea, the constant and the only plea, of our ministers for their encroachments in the East, is, *necessity*; the necessity of subduing, or annexing, such or such a state, in order to secure our own do-

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minions, and to preserve the tranquillity of India. And, is not this the plea of Napoleon? Has it not been the plea constantly set up by all the invading and encroaching rulers of France? Does not Napoleon insist, that the annexation of Genoa, for instance, is necessary to the security of France and to the preservation of the tranquillity of Europe? Most falsely he so insists, I am ready to allow; but, is our plea in India founded in perfect truth? Granted, that Napoleon's is "the tyrant's plea;" but, is ours the plea of justice and moderation? And, if the *press* at Paris is a slave in the cause of oppression, is the *press* at Calcutta at perfect liberty to comment upon the motives whence conquests and encroachments are made in India?—The *partition of Poland* forms another ground of justification of the conduct of France; and here, too, have we to smart for Mr. Pitt's love of power and place. It had often been asserted, that it was owing to his miserable policy in the year 1791, that all confidence in England was lost upon the Continent, and that the North of Europe, in particular, became suspicious of us; but, the grounds of this charge were never fully stated, in print, at least, till the first open rupture between the Pitts and the Addingtons induced these latter formally to prefer the charge, in the pamphlet from which my motto is taken, which pamphlet has always been ascribed to Mr. Bragge, and which I shall now quote somewhat at length, first reminding the reader, that, though the author endeavours to implicate Lord Grenville in the transaction, and, indeed, to throw on him great part of the blame, his Lordship did not come into the cabinet till the series of measures drew to a close. "Let me now," says he, "come to a transaction which I before hinted at, and let me in my turn inquire a little more particularly into the claims of the *late administration* to superior wisdom and vigour in their negotiations with foreign powers." [We must just stop here to remark upon the extreme candour of this Addington advocate, who, whenever commendation is to be bestowed upon measures adopted in the early part of the Pitt administration, takes care to remind the reader, that Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham did not then make a part of it; but, when censure is the object, he is careful not to remind the reader of that circumstance.] "I shall carry back my reader to a period, it may be said, somewhat remote; it is, however, what I believe has had more influence upon the conduct of Prussia, and has contributed to its base desertion" [Your prudent Ad-

ditionian can be venomous, upon occasion, and rude too], "and the turn which affairs have taken in the North, more than all that this ministry has done, or could do, if they were even as wicked and as foolish as Cobbett represents them to be. What I allude to is the Russian armament in 1791. Will it be believed, that this *same administration*" [still appearing to suppose that Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham made part of it], "which is cried up as so exclusively wise and penetrating, and, above all, so firm and vigorous, should not only have exposed itself to absolute derision and contempt, but committed a deliberate breach of faith? That it shrunk from engagements which it had contracted, out of pure fear lest a war should be unpopular; lest (shall I say it!) a clamour for peace should shake them in their seats?" [Oh, yes! say it! say it, by all means; for, rest assured, that it is a truth which will be very useful to the nation, if it can be once thoroughly impressed upon their minds.] "Every Englishman will easily enter into the feelings of Lord Whitworth upon this occasion. Never was mortification more complete. He had, by direction from our court, held the most high and threatening language, and protested that war would be the immediate consequence of his remonstrances not being attended to. Relying, however, upon the assurances given by the gentlemen on the other side, the Russian cabinet stood firm; and our great, our mighty, our vigorous negotiators gave way. They did, indeed, show some delicacy for Lord Whitworth; they did put it in his power to shut himself up, as he did, for six weeks; and sent Mr. Faulkner to make their apology to the Empress, and assure her, I suppose, of their readiness to receive her future commands. Mr. Fox, and his friends, backed by Mr. Wilberforce, will, perhaps, still insist, that Ochakoff was not an object for which we ought to go to war. Be it so; but, where, then, was the wisdom of Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt to commit the country for such an object? Or, why persist in it till they involved the nation in disgrace. The fact is, and, though not generally known, is now no secret, that our interposition respecting Ochakoff was only part of a system connected with the late King of Prussia, for the express purpose of preventing the partition of Poland. Most certain it is, and it was the opinion of Stanislaus himself, that it was owing to Mr. Fox's opposition that he was stripped

“ of his kingdom. In retracting as we did, “ we left nothing for Prussia to do, but to “ take her part of the spoil: we gave her “ also an example of desertion, upon which “ she has amply improved.” After some further remarks, not much to our present purpose, the author concludes in the memorable words, which are contained in the motto to this sheet, and to which I beg leave to refer the reader.—So, Stanislaus himself thought that he owed the loss of his kingdom to the *opposition of Mr. Fox!* Would not this unfortunate prince have been more correct, if he had imputed the loss of his crown to the political selfishness, to the love of domination, or, as the Addingtonian expresses himself, to the *fear of losing place*, in Mr. Pitt? Observe, that the system, which is now known to have been concerted between this country and Prussia, for preventing the partition of Poland, was never communicated, and was not known, to the nation or to the parliament, and, perhaps, to nobody but the cabinet, at the time when Mr. Fox opposed a war with Russia, and which war, as far as any one not in the secret could judge, had for its object nothing but Ochakoff. But, be that as it may, the expression put into the mouth of Stanislaus has a meaning with nobody but the members of THE FAMILY. Mr. Pitt wished to preserve the crown of Stanislaus, thinking that preservation necessary to the balance of Europe and the interest of England; but, Mr. Fox compelled him to abandon his scheme for preserving it, by rendering the intended war unpopular, and thereby exposing Mr. Pitt to the loss of his place if he persevered in it; and, as the *keeping of his place was absolutely necessary*, the abandonment of Poland followed of course, as a consequence of *Mr. Fox's opposition!* One would think, that Stanislaus, from his manner of reasoning, had some of the blood of THE FAMILY in him; and, in that case, one can easily believe, that the loss of his place must have gone near to his heart. Outrageously insolent, however, as this mode of reasoning is, it is that upon which Mr. Pitt has uniformly acted, and that his adherents, with all the coolness imaginable, have as uniformly employed in his defence. Not upon one, two, or three, but upon fifty occasions, when the folly and mischief of his measures have been made apparent, the answer of these abject followers has been: “ very true; but how “ could he help it; the Opposition were so “ violent; the people were so prejudiced; “ and, sometimes, the King was so deter- “ mined.” In short, the conclusion always

is, “ he was compelled to do so, or so, or lose his place;” which latter is what they never appear to think it possible for any one to wish him to prefer. To this mode of reasoning, and to the measures proceeding from it, we may fairly attribute nearly all the calamity and disgrace, which has befallen this nation in the course of the last twenty years. In illustration of the truth of this position, numerous instances will present themselves to the mind of the reader; but, we will take the one of which we have been speaking. If Mr. Pitt had been under the guidance of political principle, if he had preferred his measures to his place, he would have adhered to his agreement with Prussia. Mr. Fox might, perhaps, even when he came to be fully informed of the real object of the war, have still opposed it; and he might have succeeded to supplant Mr. Pitt by the means of that opposition. But, what would have been the consequence? Either Mr. Fox would have fulfilled the engagement entered into with Prussia, or he would not. If the former, the partition of Poland might have been prevented; and, if the latter, though a breach of national faith would have been committed, it would not have been committed by the same minister who had made the agreement; and, at worst, there would have been a *chance* of preventing the partition of Poland. So, of the late war with France. If Mr. Pitt, regardless of his place, when put in competition with political principle, had resolved on a war explicitly declared for the House of Bourbon, and solely for the House of Bourbon, without any mixture of suspicious motives or measures, he might, probably, have lost his place; but, the consequence, likely to arise, would have been, either that Mr. Fox would have succeeded by his pacific system, or, that he would have been obliged to give way to Mr. Pitt and a war in the cause which Mr. Pitt had declared for. By one or the other of these courses, the present state of the Continent and the present dangers of England, might have been prevented; but, by the pursuing of neither; by the adopting of nothing decisive; by shifting backwards and forwards with the ebb and flow of popular opinion; by wrapping himself up in indefinite expressions, like that of “ indemnity for the past” and “ security for the future;” keeping, in short, his eye constantly fixed upon the Opposition instead of upon the enemy, and being much more solicitous about defeating them than defeating him, nothing worthy of the nation was accomplished, even victory itself served only to

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heighten disappointment; and, a war of shifts and expedients was, at last, terminated in a peace of "experiment."—Already has the minister again made considerable progress in the tortuous course. The rupture with Spain began not in an act of war. It was neither war, nor reprisals, but *precaution*. Napoleon makes an overture for a negotiation for peace: he receives an answer neither in the affirmative nor the negative: we are ready to treat with him, and yet we wish not to treat: we are to consult with another power, and that power is neither in alliance with us, nor quite not in alliance with us. In returning, for a moment, previous to my conclusion, to the subject of Novosiltzoff's note, the reader may be assured, that the request, "the pressing request" of the English minister was intended for no other purpose, or, at least, that it had no other great purpose in view, than that of providing the materials of a statement in answer to those who should be disposed to accuse the minister of having neglected the opportunity, afforded by Napoleon, of giving us a chance, at least, of peace. And, as to the *coalition*, that coalition with the hopes of which the ministerial papers amuse their besotted readers, I am the most deceived of mortals if the endeavours to effect it, and the demands of subsidies to support it, have any other object in view than to produce a clashing of opinions amongst the members of the Opposition in parliament, and, of course, a division of their strength, without which it is pretty evident, that the Pitt ministry cannot long exist, unless some circumstance or other should give more than ordinary facility to the system of "accommodation," some few of the facts, relating to which, have, of late, come to light. Mr. Pitt will certainly fail in all his endeavours to divide the Opposition. I can, for my part, perceive no means that a coalition upon the Continent, or the subsidies inseparable from it, would furnish for giving a chance of producing a difference of opinion amongst the members of the Opposition; for, whatever difference of opinion might exist amongst them as to coalitions or subsidies during the last war, all the circumstances are now changed; and, even if they now differed in opinion as to the expediency of a coalition against France, and as to the subsidies to be granted in consequence thereof, they must all agree, that not one penny ought to be trusted in the hands of the present minister for that purpose. They have seen him at the head of coalitions;

they have seen him making war and making peace; they have seen him in all situations, and engaged in all sorts of measures, with regard to foreign powers, and they have always seen him fail. Upon looking back over his twenty years' administration, they have seen the country fall lower and lower at every step which he has conducted her, till, at last, instead of being one of the very first of the first-rate powers of Europe, she quietly takes her place as a second-rate power, and seems not very confident of retaining even that. Not only have they seen this; but they have seen the cause of it; and that cause they have found to be inseparable from his possession of power. To reject all applications for subsidies, what other reason, therefore, do they want, than that he is to have the distribution of them, and to be the principal contriver of the measures, to which they are to give effect? Not a shilling; no, not a single shilling, would I vote, to be placed at his disposal, as a subsidy to any power, or to all the powers of the Continent, supposing them willing to join us in the war; for, I am thoroughly convinced, and for the reasons which I have stated, that, under his management, no coalition will ever be productive of good to England.

INVASION.—The sagacious person, who, for the entertainment of the "fashionable world," writes, about every three days, a couple of columns, in the Morning Post newspaper, upon the subject of invasion, has lately given it as his opinion, that the invasion will take place immediately; and for the following curious reason. "Buonaparté," says he, "is now convinced, that a powerful coalition, upon the continent, will speedily take place, and be brought into operation against him; and, the frantic tyrant, in a fit of *despair*, has resolved to attempt an invasion of this country, in hopes of obtaining a victory that may intimidate Russia and Austria."—The reader was duly apprized of the sagacity of this political preceptor of the "fashionable world," and, therefore, I shall trouble him with very few remarks upon the passage here quoted. I cannot, however, refrain from observing, that whatever admiration I may feel for the politics of it, its philosophy is much too profound for me; for, I cannot, for my life, conceive it probable, that a man, from feelings of *despair*, should engage in an enterprise in hopes of meeting with signal success! To say the truth, the nonsense written about invasion, if the periodical threat of invasion produced no other effect, would be a very serious evil. It is a di-

grace to the country, to the common sense of the country, to see and hear, what we daily see and hear upon the subject. To give opinions is useless, but, I cannot help repeating mine, which is, that no real attempt at invasion will be made for a year or two yet to come; and, my reason is simply this, that the interest of the enemy evidently is to keep us as long as he can in expectation of it, before he actually makes it. In an invasion, at this time, he would meet with many difficulties, which time would remove; and, whatever opinion I may have of his heart, I have a very high opinion of his head.—Amongst many other things that have been removed out of the way, from the coast, it is with great satisfaction that every one hears of the removal of the Colonel of the Cinque-Port volunteers; for, however widely men may differ as to other matters, they seem to be unanimous in thinking, that the greater distance he is from the scene of danger, the less that danger will be.—There can be no doubt of the correctness of the official statement given by Lord Harrington to the troops under his command, that there has been “an embarkation of a considerable number of troops in Holland; that a fleet of men of war is ready to sail thence; and that there are increased preparations at Boulogne and in its neighbourhood:” but, if I knew that a hundred thousand men were actually embarked, I should not, merely on that account, believe, that the attempt at invasion was about to be made. The object, at present, is to *harrass us*; and, that object is not now to be accomplished without *strong indications*. Whoever has taken the pains to examine the present French plan of warfare against England, and has paid much attention to the operations of the enemy, will, I am certain, have expected to see the indications which he now sees, and to see them grow stronger and stronger, in proportion as our apprehensions, or rather our alertness, diminishes; till, at length, the flotilla will come almost to our shores, before we shall seriously think of turning out to resist the invaders. The French know, they well know, the nature of a volunteer force; and, we may be assured, that every part of our system, which is not of a permanent nature, will prove perfectly useless in the resisting of invasion.—We should, nevertheless, be constantly upon our guard. All those whose immediate duty it is to be instrumental in the defence of the country, should keep constantly at their post; and, those whose

immediate duty does not so call upon them, should neglect none of the means that are within their power to afford aid to the military, in case of need. For, when the danger comes, it is useless to stand inquiring about *the cause*; when an opposer of the Pitts and Dundases feels the yoke of foreign slavery about his neck, the reflection that he has been zealous in endeavouring to shorten the duration of their power will be very little consolation to him. The French are no respecters of persons, or of parties; and, therefore, while we slacken not our endeavours to obtain for our country a wise and incorrupt administration within, let still greater exertions and greater perseverance mark our resolution to resist the enemy from without.

FAMILY QUARREL.—The reader will not have forgotten the statements and observations, upon this subject, contained in p. 161, *et seq.* And I have only to add thereto, that it is now about twelve days, since they were submitted to the public, and that no denial of the facts they contain has been made, in any of the public prints. The “*NEAR OBSERVER*,” from whose pen came the inundating articles in the Times, has become silent, perfectly dumb; and, in one additional article, which has recently appeared in that paper, from an apparently new hand, the fact respecting Mr. Bond and his sought-for promotion so explicitly stated by me, is not denied. All mention of it is, indeed, avoided, and a general declaration is made, which may, or may not, be intended to include the case of Mr. Bond and the Judge Advocate Generalship. An attempt, in some very poor reasoning, is made to palliate other parts of the conduct of the Addingtons; but the writer has thought proper to take no notice whatever of the statement as to *the time* when, and the *circumstances* under which, Mr. Bragge put a stop to the practices of Mr. Trotter.—I have no wish to perpetuate resentment against the Addingtons; but every man, putting forward claims to public favour, and especially if his views evidently extend to political power, ought to be seen in his *true light*; and, I shall not disguise, that the exposition above referred to, and which exposition has, I trust, produced its desired effect, was, in some degree, occasioned by the lofty pretensions set up for Lord Sidmouth and his friends by writers evidently familiarly connected with them, if not writing under their dictation.